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Abstract 
This study examines the process of career advancement among college-graduate employees in 
a Japanese and an American firm. It focuses on the question of how the chances of promotion 
are affected by the ranking or quality of educational institutions previously attended by the 
employees and the specialization in college. The data come from detailed employment records 
of career-track employees in a large Japanese and American organization in the financial and 
insurance sector. We examine the rate of promotions to various levels within the organizational 
hierarchy using the event history analysis technique. Although the effects of college quality and 
major on socio-economic attainment have been reported in previous studies, this study shows 
that their effects on promotion prospects within an organization depend on the levels of 
organizational hierarchy. The study concludes with a discussion of different interpretations of 
the effect of college quality and of how educational credentials are utilized in promotion 
decisions by employers in the two organizations. 
Acknowledgements 
An earlier version of the paper was presented at the meeting of the International Sociological 
Association in Bielefeld, Germany, in July 1994. This research was supported by the Abe 
Fellowship from the Social Science Research Council (to Hiroshi Ishida) and a grant from the 
U.S. Israel Binational Foundation (to Seymour Spilerman). 
INTRODUCTION 
College education has been viewed as a major source of socio-economic 
advancement. Numerous studies have documented a correlation between education 
and rewards in the labor market. With a large number of young people now 
attending institutions of higher learning in many industrial societies, 
stratification and differentiation among those educated in such institutions 
has begun to emerge: there seem to be significant differences in socio-
economic attainment among the college-educated depending upon which college or 
university they attended and what kinds of subjects they studied. This paper 
examines the process of career advancement among college-graduate employees in 
two large organizations, one in Japan and the other in the United States. In 
particular, it will focus on the question of how the chances of promotion in 
an organization are affected by the ranking or quality of educational 
institutions previously attended by the employees and the field of study which 
the employees specialized in while at college. 
Stratification in higher education and its impact on labor market 
outcomes are issues of much concern in both Japan and the United States. 
Numerous American studies have reported that college quality significantly 
affects the attainment of occupational status and income and that its effects 
- particularly the effect on income - do not seem to disappear even after such 
factors as social background, ability, grades and aspirations are introduced 
as control variables (Alwin 1974; Griffin and Alexander 1978; Trusheim and 
Crouse 1981). While some studies (Spaeth 1970; Tinto 1980) have described the 
influence of college quality on early occupational attainment, within ten 
years of college completion, Sewell and Hauser (1980) have speculated that the 
effect of college quality is probably greatest at the peak of occupational 
attainment (see also Solomon 1975). Wise (1975a; 1975b) also showed that 
college quality, in addition to college grades, exerts a significant impact on 
salaries and promotion chances within an organization. 
Top management positions in America's large business corporations are 
over-represented by alumni of elite institutions (Warner and Abegglen 1975; 
Pierson 1969; Klitgaard 1985). Useem and Karabel (1986) found that entry into 
senior management in large corporations was facilitated by the possession of 
not only a B.A. degree from an elite institution but also an M.B.A. or an 
L.L.B. degree from a prominent program, and that the effects of earned 
credentials were independent of the class background of managers. 
Within the context of Japanese society, the idea of "educational 
credentialism" implies that educational credentials are the major determinant 
of socio-economic success, and that the quality or ranking of colleges affects 
the attainment of socio-economic rewards. Because the entrance into 
prestigious institutions of higher learning is highly competitive in Japan, it 
is believed that the alumni of these institutions occupy distinctly advantaged 
positions in the labor market and that such benefits are greater in Japan than 
in other societies (see Kelly 1991; Ishida 1993 for reviews in English of the 
notion of "educational credentialism"). 
The documentation of the effect of college quality in Japan centers 
around unequal chances of obtaining entry jobs and differential production 
rates of managers by the graduates of different institutions of higher 
learning (Aso 1969; Iwauchi 1980; Koyama 1981; Rohlen 1983). Many companies 
develop long-term agreements with particular schools to recruit employees 
although they do not openly admit their policy; the larger the firm, the more 
likely that it recruits only from elite institutions (Ehara 1973; Hashizume 
1976) . Students from less competitive institutions usually are not even 
considered for career-track jobs in large companies. 
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Koike and Watanabe (1979), arguing against the thesis of "educational 
credentialism," claimed that although highly prestigious national universities 
tend to have higher rates of producing middle-rank managers, some new private 
schools, which achieved university status after World War II, and public 
prefectural universities had good records despite their lower rankings within 
the hierarchy of universities. Takeuchi (1981), a sociologist of education, 
re-estimated the production rates using a more refined method and arrived at a 
different conclusion: highly competitive national and private universities 
showed significantly higher rates of producing both middle-level managers and 
top business executives than non-competitive schools including those reported 
by Koike and Watanabe.1 Other studies (Takeuchi and Aso 1981; Ishida 1993) 
reported occupational and income advantages to the alumni of prestigious 
institutions. 
Furthermore, according to the thesis of educational credentialism, the 
effect of college quality is expected to persist over the employee's entire 
working career. Perhaps the most provocative statement about the long-lasting 
effect of education came from the OECD (1971) report of the Japanese 
educational system. It claimed that once the ranking of individuals in the 
educational hierarchy is determined, those who come from higher ranked schools 
are likely to be rewarded with promotions and income independent of their job 
performance. Therefore, we expect from the thesis of "educational 
credentialism" college quality effects that are more pervasive and persistent 
across one's career in Japan than in the United States. 
As we have shown above, in both societies there is a considerable 
literature which documents the effects of college quality on labor market 
outcomes. However, there are differing views about the assessment and 
interpretation of the returns to college quality. At least three versions of 
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the assessment, we believe, are applicable to both societies. First, 
attendance in highly prestigious institutions increases cognitive and non-
cognitive skills which in turn lead to higher productivity. It is the 
investment in high quality education which enhances individual productivity 
(Becker 1964; Mincer 1974; Wise 1975a). Proponents of the human capital 
approach emphasize cognitive aspects of the skills learned in college while 
others point to the importance of personality and non-cognitive traits over 
technical skills that are incurred in college (Edwards 1975; Kanter 1977; 
Squires 1979; Collins 1979). On the other hand, high-ranking institutions are 
likely to admit more able students who would be highly productive even without 
differential value added by college training (Karabel and Austin 1975; Addison 
and Siebert 1979). 
What is common to both of these formulations is that alumni of 
prestigious institutions are considered highly productive workers, either 
because they acquired cognitive and non-cognitive skills in college or because 
they were promising individuals to begin with and thus were accepted by 
prestigious institutions. Without direct measurements of ability and skills, 
we are not able to distinguish between the two formulations since both predict 
a significant effect of college quality on promotion. 
The second version of the interpretation of a college quality effect 
pertains to the "signaling" thesis of educational credentials. Employers may 
use college quality to screen employees when they do not have measures of 
productivity (Arrow 1973; Spence 1973). If college quality is used as a 
signal, then the effect of this variable will be strongest at the beginning of 
a worker's career and its impact should diminish over time as other measures 
of productivity and performance become available. 
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A variant of this formulation suggests that alumni of highly 
prestigious institutions are initially assigned to positions which offer 
better prospects for training and rapid promotion (Ushiogi 1978; Takeuchi 
1981). In the absence of performance measures at the beginning of the career, 
college quality is utilized by a firm to allocate employees to different 
tracks, if the differentiation of workers takes place relatively early in 
their careers. In this instance, the effect of college quality will probably 
be greatest for early promotions but will remain significant in later stages. 
The third version of the assessment of the association between college 
quality and promotion relates to networks and political alliances among alumni 
(Taira and Wada 1987; Rosenbaum 1984; Clark 1979; Useem and Karabel 1986). As 
shown noted above, some schools dominate in the production of top corporate 
and bureaucratic elites. The advantage may derive directly from informal 
personal ties among members from the same school. This effect may also 
reflect the tendency for students in highly prestigious institutions to come 
disproportionately from a privileged background. Upper-class background is 
known to increase the chances of entry into top positions in the business 
world (Domhoff 1971; 1979; Collins 1979; Mannari 1974). 
We must therefore examine whether employees from a particular 
institution or a group of prestigious institutions, such as Ivy League 
schools, have unusually better chances of promotion in the organization. It 
is especially important to separate the effect of a particular school from the 
effect of its position in the quality ranking of institutions. Among 
institutions with the same quality score, it is possible that the alumni from 
a particular school form a network within a corporation and influence its 
promotion decisions. 
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In summary, we will examine the relationship between the ranking of 
educational institutions previously attended by employees and their promotion 
prospects in a Japanese and an American organization. According to the thesis 
of "educational credentialism" in Japan, we expect that the effect of college 
quality is more pervasive and persistent over the career course than in the 
United States. On the other hand, the three versions of a college quality 
effect could work equally well in both societies; hence, no clear predictions 
about cross-national differences can be derived from these formulations. 
Instead, we will attempt to evaluate the validity of the three different 
formulations of a college quality effect in each country. 
The employees' major field of study in college is the other variable 
that will be investigated in detail in this paper. Previous studies have 
reported that field of specialization affects later occupational attainment. 
Specialized knowledge and skills, such as those acquired as a mathematics or 
engineering major, may be directly relevant to the performance of certain 
types of jobs. College major may also be used by employers as an indicator 
of motivation, commitment, and other cognitive and affective characteristics 
of job applicants. 
In the United States, studies dating from the 1950s (Gordon and Howell 
1959; Jacob 1957) showed that employers tended to regard with some reservation 
students who had majored in liberal arts when the school had also offered 
majors in business or engineering. Liberal arts students were often 
considered to be ambivalent about working in the private sector or even 
hostile to the profit-making orientation of business (Collins 1971; 1979). 
Some studies of MBA graduates (e.g., Pfeffer 1977) reported that engineering 
majors were offered higher initial salaries but that liberal arts majors 
tended to catch up over time and eventually earned more. This may indicate 
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superior social and political abilities of liberal arts majors, especially in 
high corporate ranks where negotiating style and interpersonal skills may be 
more relevant to job success than technical knowledge. 
It is a well-known fact in Japan that students who majored in 
humanities, rather than in sciences or social sciences, are at a disadvantage 
in receiving invitations to job interviews. Japanese companies seem to give 
preference to science and social science majors, and regard humanities majors 
as naive and less committed to business values. Some companies indicate in 
advance the kinds of majors that they seek and will interview only those who 
satisfy this requirement. Although there seems to be a clear preference for 
majors in the fields of science and social science in both countries, what is 
valued and appreciated by employers in students who specialized in these 
fields appears to be different between Japanese and American companies. 
Japanese managers are more concerned with motivation and orientation 
towards business, that is, affective attributes, and much less with practical 
work-related skills. Ishida (1993), for example, reported in his interviews 
with personnel managers of Japanese firms that students who had prior work 
experience and possess job-related skills are in fact disadvantaged, rather 
than advantaged, in the recruitment process. Japanese companies prefer to 
hire motivated but inexperienced students and provide on-the-job training. 
In contrast, American managers welcome those who have had hands-on 
training and can contribute immediately to the productivity of the company. 
Exposure to the business world through course work, internships and summer 
positions is highly regarded in selecting job applicants. Useem (1989) 
reported that American managers generally prefer business majors and 
applicants with previous exposure to business practices because they are 
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familiar with the vocabulary and operation of business organizations and are 
likely to possess favorable attitudes towards business. 
There is another cross-national difference regarding the association 
between college major and socio-economic attainment. Japanese literature 
documents the effect of college major on the process of recruitment of college 
graduates, but beyond the entry level very little is reported about the 
effects of college major - the only exception is probably the different career 
trajectory of engineers in manufacturing firms (Pucik 1984, Imano 1991). The 
lack of interest in college major is probably related to the fact that 
Japanese firms tend to emphasize generalist training and rarely create 
specialist career tracks, thereby not making use of previous training. The 
emphasis on in-house training may also depress the effects of college major. 
On the other hand, some studies of American firms (e.g., Collins 1979; Wise 
1975a) have pointed out long-term effects of college major on later 
occupational and income attainment. Employees who are trained in analytic 
fields, such as mathematics and natural science disciplines, are advantaged 
with regard to promotion in the middle levels of the organizational hierarchy 
where sophisticated cognitive skills are crucial for superior job performance 
(Pfeffer 1981; Spilerman and Lunde 1991). 
In this paper we will examine how field of specialization affects an 
employee's chances of advancement in both a Japanese and an American company. 
We investigate the effects of college major on promotion chances in both 
societies, though, as argued above, the effects of college major can be 
interpreted as a proxy for specialized training and knowledge (especially in 
the case of the United States) or as an indicator of commitment to business 
activities and other non-cognitive characteristics. We therefore hypothesize 
that its effect is greatest at the beginning of the career in Japan because 
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college major is probably used to select workers committed to business 
careers, while its effect persists throughout the career course in the United 
States because of greater job specialization and because certain majors -
especially technical majors - may serve as entry requirements for promising 
career lines. 
DATA, METHODS AND VARIABLES 
The Japanese data base comes from the employment records of a large Japanese 
company in the financial and insurance sector. It contains a considerable 
amount of information on all career-track white-collar workers who were 
employed in the firm in July 1993: gender, birth date, family composition, age 
at entry into the firm, education, and chronological records of location, 
status ranks and salary grade levels. The American data base, which comes 
from the personnel records of a large company in the same industrial sector 
with headquarters in New York, contains similar demographic information as 
well as complete work histories of those who were with the firm in 1970 and of 
those who were hired into the firm from 1971 to 1978. 
We restricted our analysis of both companies to employees with college 
degrees because we were primarily interested in the attainment process of 
college graduates. Female employees were excluded from the Japanese sample 
because all have been recruited after 1986 when the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Law was enacted and thus have not yet advanced far in the 
corporate hierarchy. Employees who entered the firm from the external labor 
market, that is, from other companies rather than directly from college, were 
also excluded in the Japanese analysis because the proportion of external 
hires was negligible - less than one percent - and their promotion pattern 
appears to be different from that of other employees. 
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Because we are interested in the occurrence of discrete events in time 
promotions - in terms of employee characteristics, we utilize Cox's 
proportional hazard rate model (Cox and Oakes 1985). The equation is in the 
following form: 
where t is a random variable indicating duration (in months) in the origin 
rank or grade, the X's are independent variables and the B's are coefficients 
attached to independent variables. Departures from the firm, demotions and 
incomplete durations were treated as censored observations. 
Promotion 
Our dependent variable, promotion, is conceived differently in the two 
companies. In the Japanese company, the notion of promotion is associated 
with ascent in the hierarchy of status ranks. Status ranks, such as "section 
chief" (kacho) and "department head" (bucho), adhere to the individual with 
specific responsibilities and authority, but they are not necessarily 
associated with specific job titles. Promotion entails an increase in the 
extent of control over subordinates and greater influence in decision-making 
within the organization. Table 1 shows the distribution of status ranks in the 
Japanese company. We will analyze chances of promotion to three different 
levels of the rank hierarchy: (1) deputy section chief, (2) section chief, and 
(3) department head. 
In the American firm, the essential feature of the reward structure is 
a hierarchy of salary grade levels (SGL). All job titles in the company are 
assigned to one of twenty-one salary grades based on standard job evaluation 
procedures. Annual salaries depend on the grade level, time in grade, and 
performance. A promotions is defined as an increase in salary grade level and 
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does not necessarily involve a change in authority or responsibilities. Table 
2 shows the distribution of employees by SGL and major job categories. For a 
comparison with the Japanese company with its discrete status categories, we 
focus on the transition (or promotion) into three key salary grades in an 
otherwise "continuous" hierarchy: entry into SGL 7, 14 and 21. The first 
transition, as can be seen from Table 2, largely corresponds to the difference 
between clerical and administrative jobs. Clerical jobs have a ceiling grade 
level at about level 7, and entry into SGL 7 usually signifies that the 
employee is in the administrative sector, either having begun in an 
administrative job or having transferred from one of the clerical job 
categories. About one-third of entrants into administrative positions in the 
American company transferred from the clerical lines. The second transition 
which we investigate relates to difference within administrative jobs. 
Employees who are in SGL 14 or above are considered to be in the senior 
management ranks, below the vice-presidential grades. This is our second 
boundary. Finally, SGL 21 corresponds to the company's vice-presidential 
ranks. 
College Quality 
Names of colleges and universities were coded into selectivity scores. The 
Japanese scores were taken from Obunsha's standardized rank scores (hensachi). 
These scores were derived by Obunsha, a major mock-exam administrating company 
and publisher, based on the scores of the mock-entrance exams of more than 
300,000 applicants together with admission offers received by the applicants. 
Because detailed scores were available by academic department, we assigned a 
score to an individual employee based on his college code, college major code 
and entry year. The scores ranged from 400 to 777. 
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The American scores were taken from the Astin's (1971) college 
selectivity scores, which are based on average SAT scores (verbal and math) of 
entering students in the mid-1960s. Because most employees in the American 
firm attended college in the 1950s and 1960s, the Astin scores provide a good 
means of ranking of the institutions at the time of employee attendance. The 
minimum score was 530 and the maximum 1418. In addition to the selectivity 
variable, a dummy term representing the lack of a college name was entered 
into regression models of the American data since 40 percent of the sample did 
not have the name of the college attended. Missing cases on college names in 
the Japanese data were less than one percent of the respondents and were too 
small to introduce a separate dummy variable and thus excluded from the 
analysis. 
In addition to the measure of college quality, we introduced a few 
dummy variables representing specific schools or a group of schools (Ivy 
League institutions) in order to test the argument about school ties and 
networks. Schools that have been attended by large numbers of employees were 
selected for dummy variables (see Table 4 below). 
College Major 
Detailed codes for the fields of study were grouped into six categories: 
economics, business/management, social sciences, humanities, 
science/math/engineering, and other major. Despite the similarity in the 
labels used in the two countries, there were some cross-national differences. 
In Japan the category of "social sciences" includes almost exclusively law 
majors, and almost all the employees in the category of "other" were marine 
science or marine-related majors. In Japanese universities, the faculty of 
humanities normally includes history, sociology, social work, as well as 
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language and literature majors. In the United States, history, sociology, and 
social work were included in the "social sciences" category, and the category 
of "business/management" included a relatively large number of insurance 
maj ors. 
Educational Credentials 
Because some of the American employees attended graduate schools, we 
introduced dummy variables representing the level of credentials: (1) a dummy 
for graduate school attendance without a degree, and (2) a dummy for a 
Master's Degree including M.B.A. and L.L.M. degrees and a Ph.D. degree. 
Employees with no graduate trainings were used as the base category. There 
was a very small number of Japanese employees (less than one percent) who had 
graduate training. 8 Since the number was so small, we did not introduce a 
separate dummy variable in the Japanese analysis. 
Control Variables 
A number of control variables were included in the regression models. For the 
analysis of the Japanese data, dummy variables for entry year into the firm, 
seniority (months in company to time of entry into the origin rank ) , and age 
(as of entry into the origin rank) were introduced. For the analysis of the 
American data, the following controls were included: dummy variables for entry 
SGL, seniority (months in company to time of entry into the origin SGL) , a 
dummy variable representing zero seniority (that is, entered the company in 
the origin SGL), age (as of entry into the origin SGL), a dummy variable 
indicating that the employee entered the administrative lines from a clerical 
position versus being hired directly into an administrative job, a dummy 
variable indicating that the entry job code is missing (that is, we could not 
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determine whether the employee began in a clerical or an administrative line), 
a dummy for female employee, and three dummy variables representing race -
Black, Hispanic, and Asian (using White as the omitted base category). 
ANALYSIS 
We begin our analysis by examining uni-variate statistics. As shown in Tables 
1 and 3, both organizations adopt a pyramid-shaped reward structure with the 
highest managerial positions awarded to no more than ten percent of the 
employees. Japanese managers are older, and they tend to spend a longer 
duration in the company before reaching higher positions than their American 
counterparts. It is also important to notice that coefficients of variation 
for both age and duration are much smaller in the Japanese firm. These 
figures suggest that promotions into a higher rank normally take place within 
a limited age and duration range in Japan. Indeed, there seems to be a 
minimum age and/or duration requirement for promotion (Spllerman and Ishida 
1995). For example, entry Into the position of deputy section chief required 
at least 10 or 11 years of seniority or the age of 33 or 34, depending upon 
the year of entry. Aside from lateral transfers, no one was promoted into the 
rank of deputy section chief until these requirements were met. Most 
employees, if they were promoted, entered the rank of deputy section chief 
after thirteen years of service. Similarly, about three-quarters of those who 
reached the rank of section chief did so after spending three to six years in 
the rank of deputy section chief. 
Table 4 presents the distribution of individual schools attended by 
employees of the Japanese and the American company. It is immediately apparent 
that the educational origin is much more concentrated in the Japanese company. 
The first five schools in Table 4 account for 47 percent of Japanese employees 
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but only 14 percent of employees in the American sample. Although the total 
number of schools from which the company recruited is much smaller in Japan -
about 100 schools versus 600 schools in the American firm - the concentration 
of the educational origin is still conspicuous. This suggests that the 
linkages between universities and employers, as far as the recruitment process 
is concerned, are tighter in Japan (Rosenbaum and Kariya 1989). The Japanese 
firm recruits heavily from a small number of schools, probably replying on 
alumni networks and long-term relationships with college professors and 
college placement officers. In contrast, the American firm recruits more 
extensively from a variety of schools. We also observe a large number of 
employees coming from colleges in the New York area, but this is the location 
of the company's headquarters where about a half of the employees in the 
company work. 
Table 5 shows the distribution of college majors in our Japanese and 
American samples. The preference given at the time of recruitment to 
business/management majors is apparent in both companies. However, the 
American company appears to be more interested than the Japanese company in 
hiring humanities and science/math/engineering majors. Again, analogous to 
the distribution of colleges, the Japanese company concentrates its 
recruitments, especially in the fields of economics, law and business, which 
account for 88 percent of all employees, whereas the American firm recruits 
from more diverse academic fields. The cross-national difference may in part 
reflect the differences in prestige among majors between the two societies. 
In Japan, although the prestige of the institution is undoubtedly central and 
is given priority, the fields of law and economics probably confer sizable 
additional prestige increments. In the United States, in the absence of an 
undergraduate specialization in law, students who majored in 
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business/management, social sciences, and engineering seem to be hired in 
large numbers. 
Beginning with Table 6, we present the results of hazard regression 
models of promotion. Tables 6 to 8 report the results of the analysis of 
Japanese data. Each table reports promotion models of different dependent 
variables in the form of equation (1) shown above. Table 6 reports 
regressions of the promotion hazard from non-management to deputy section 
chief on education and other control variables. Table 7 reports the same 
regressions for promotion from deputy section chief to section chief, with the 
sample restricted to employees who reached deputy section chief. Finally, 
Table 8 examines the promotion from section chief to department head, 
contingent on reaching the rank of section chief. Within each table there are 
five regression models and each model contains different education variables. 
Instead of going through the details of regression coefficients, let 
us first focus on the effects of college quality. Model (1) of Tables 6 to 8 
shows its effect after entry year, with controls present for seniority and 
age. Our quality variable does not exert significant effects on the 
likelihood of joining lower and middle managerial ranks - deputy section chief 
and section chief (Tables 6 and 7). In contrast, entry into upper managerial 
positions is influenced by college quality (Table 8). The significant effect 
of college quality on the chances of promotion into upper management does not 
disappear even after other credential variables, that is, school dummies or 
college major, are simultaneously introduced into the equation (Models (3) and 
(5)). 
The effect of quality, therefore, varies with the organizational rank. 
Promotions in lower levels of the organization are not dependent on college 
quality; rather it is only in the upper ranks where school quality makes a 
- 16 -
difference. As we already know from Table 1, to be considered for the rank of 
department head, employees must have some twenty years of service in the 
company (except for those who have entered the firm by means of lateral 
transfers whom we have excluded from the analysis). In other words, the 
effect of college quality begins to have an effect on promotion only after 
twenty years from the time of graduation from college. 
The effects of graduating from a particular school in Japan show a 
similar picture. As indicated in Model (4) of tables 5 and 6, these effects 
are not significant on promotion rates in the lower levels of the 
organization, but they do influence the prospects of reaching the position of 
department head (Table 8); in particular, the alumni of private school A and 
national school II - both highly competitive institutions - occupy a 
distinctly advantaged position for entering upper management. However, as 
shown in Model (5) in Table 8, the effects of these two schools are reduced 
substantially and become non-significant when college quality is introduced 
into the equation. In other words, attendance in these two schools does not 
offer an additional advantage over and above the effect of general ranking of 
institutions of higher learning. 
The impact of the field of specialization on promotion rates again 
varies by the organizational rank. Promotions in the lower and upper levels 
of the company are not affected by college major, except for those who 
specialized in marine-related subjects - the "other" category - in the lower 
level. Promotion chances in the middle level seem to differ depending upon 
the fields of study: employees with background in law, economics and 
management are clearly advantaged over those with a humanities background. As 
shown in Model (3) of table 7, the advantage of these majors is independent of 
college quality; regardless of the quality of institution, employees who 
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majored in these fields have better promotion prospects. What appears to be 
clear in the promotion process in the middle level of the organization is that 
employees with a humanity background (about five percent of the Japanese 
sample) are put into a particularly disadvantaged position. Since over 80 
percent of employees majored in either law, economics, or commerce and 
management; it is probably not the social science training of these employees 
that the company is trying to utilize. Instead, the company may be using 
college major to identify those who are considered not worth investing 
additional training. 
It is worth noting that the employees who majored in marine-related 
fields seem to show higher rates of promotion even though they all came from 
non-competitive institutions (see Table 5) . According to interviews with 
personnel managers, the Japanese company does take into account the field of 
study when making divisional and departmental assignments at least in the 
early stages of the career, and it is very likely that those with marine-
science background are assigned to the marine division of the company. It is 
possible that because of this specialized assignment, employees with marine-
related training have better chances of promotion into the rank of deputy 
section chief and probably into the rank of section chief as well. However, 
these employees are not necessarily advantaged in promotions at the highest 
level probably because entry into upper management is more likely to be 
determined- by general ability and leadership quality than by specialized 
skills. 
Tables 9 to 11 present the results of the analysis of the American 
data. As in the Japanese tables, each of these tables represent hazard 
regression models of promotion into different levels of the organization: in 
this case, level demarcations were chosen to represent (1) entry into 
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administrative ranks - promotion from grade levels 1 to 6 to grade level 7 
(Table 9), (2) the transition into middle management - promotion from grade 
levels 7 to 13 to grade level 14 (Table 10) , and (3) the transition into 
senior management - promotion from grade levels 14 or above to the vice 
presidential rank (Table 11). 
The findings from these tables parallel in many ways those of the 
Japanese analysis. Both the effects of college quality and college major vary 
with organizational rank. College quality significantly affects the chances 
of promotion in the middle levels of the organization, but not in the lower or 
upper levels. Its effect does not disappear even after controlling for school 
dummies or college major. The effects of the field of study are detected only 
in the promotion to SGL 14: employees who specialized in economics and social 
sciences have better chances than those who specialized in humanities. It is 
in the middle level of the organization where the effects of various features 
of education - college quality, college major and graduate degrees - are most 
pronounced. This probably reflects the fact that job skills relevant to job 
performance in middle levels of the organization are closely related to skills 
which were acquired in the educational system. 
The effects of school dummies are not significant at the highest 
level of the organizational hierarchy, even though many studies suggested the 
influences of political alliances and sponsorships at this level (Table 11). 
Prospects for promotion into the middle ranks of the organization, entry into 
SGL 14, seem to be increased if the employee graduated from one of Ivy League 
schools (see Table 10, row labelled Ivy League). However, the effect 
disappears when college quality variable is introduced. In other words, the 
advantage to graduates of Ivy League schools is likely to stem from the effect 
of general ranking or quality of these institutions, rather than specific 
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network ties among the graduates. At the lower level of promotions to grade 
level 7, alumni of City College, CUNY, seem to have better chances than those 
who graduated from other schools. We cannot offer a substantive reason for 
this empirical finding and suspect that it is a chance effect. 
The analysis of the American data includes an additional model which 
was not investigated in the Japanese analysis. Because many employees entered 
the American firm in mid-level grades, either because of high educational 
qualifications or because of prior work experience, we must distinguish among 
newly hired employees, those whose seniority is low (i.e., less than the 
median seniority) and those who have served the company for a long time 
(higher than the median seniority) and examine the effect of college quality 
separately for these three groups. 
The purpose of this exercise is to test the hypothesis of "signal" 
effects. For newly hired employees, college quality may be used as a signal 
of potential productivity or trainability while for workers who have been in 
the firm a long time, other measures of productivity are probably available to 
management and college quality is no longer relied upon as an indicator of 
productivity. Therefore, according to the argument of "signal" effects, we 
expect the interaction of the "zero seniority" dummy with college quality to 
be positive and the interaction between the "high seniority" dummy and college 
quality to be negative. 
At entry into the administrative ranks (promotion to grade level 7), a 
significant and positive interaction between a dummy variable representing 
"zero seniority" and college quality is found (Table 9) . College quality 
affects promotion chances among newly-hired but not among those who have 
already been in the firm. The other piece of evidence which is consistent 
with the "signal" argument comes from a significant interaction effect between 
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a "high seniority" dummy and college quality on promotion to the highest level 
(Table 11). The effect of college quality on entry into the vice presidential 
rank is significantly smaller among employees who have been in the company for 
a long time than among those who have had a relatively short service. 
However, the effect of college quality is not larger among the newly entrants, 
a finding which is contrary to the "signal" argument. 
DISCUSSIONS 
Our analysis provides empirical evidence which may be used to evaluate three 
versions of the assessment of the effects of college quality. First, in 
regard to the interpretation of college quality as a "signal," the results 
from the Japanese data do not seem to provide much support. There is no 
effect of college rank with respect to promotion into the ranks of lower 
management when the employer probably had limited information about their 
employees' productivity. On the other hand, its effect was found in later 
career phases, namely in the transition from middle to upper management. It is 
hard to believe that college quality would still be used as a "signal" after 
twenty years in the company because other direct measures of job performance 
and productivity would be available by the time an employee is eligible for 
promotion into upper management. However, it must be noted that the practice 
of recruiting heavily from a selected number of institutions, as shown in 
Table 4, is consistent with the "signal" argument. Although such a practice 
may reflect long-term associations and network ties between the employer and 
various schools, it is also possible that the employer used college reputation 
and quality to distinguish potential productivity and trainability of 
prospective employees. 
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The results from the analysis of the American data, however, provide 
limited support to the hypothesis of a "signal" effect. The empirical tests 
of the "signalling" thesis relied on the interaction between college quality 
and the seniority variables. Promotions in the lowest levels of the 
organization were influenced by college quality for those who had just entered 
the firm; college quality scores increased the likelihood of promotion for 
newly-hired employees but not for employees who had been with the firm for 
some time. It is possible that given the lack of information on job 
performance by new entrants, the quality of institutions they attended was 
used as a proxy for potential productivity. The effect of college quality on 
entry into the vice presidential rank was significantly smaller among 
employees who had been with the company for a long time than among those with 
a relatively brief service. However, no empirical support of the "signal" 
argument was found with regard to middle level promotions in the 
organizational hierarchy. The lack of the effects of college quality for new 
entrants at the middle and upper levels of the organization may be related to 
the fact that these entrants came from other companies, not directly out of 
school, and the employer might have had access to information on their job 
performance with the previous employer. Taking all these findings together, we 
are inclined to conclude that the practice by employers of using college 
quality as a "signal" occurs mainly at the beginning of workers' careers. 
Second, the hypothesis that network ties and political alliances are 
responsible for the effects of college quality receives little support. Our 
analysis of the American data noted an advantage to graduates of Ivy League 
schools with regard to promotion chances in the middle level of the 
organization. In the Japanese company, the graduates of two highly 
competitive institutions had significantly better chances of moving into upper 
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management. However, in both companies, the effects of attending elite 
institutions were substantially reduced, to a level of non-significance, once 
college quality was controlled. In other words, we could not document an 
independent effect of particular schools over and above the effect of general 
ranking and the quality of the institutions. 
There is the possibility that the effects of particular schools were 
not significant at the upper management level because there was an 
insufficient number of managers from schools which are known to foster strong 
ties and alliances among alumni, such as the Ivy League schools. To address 
this issue, we report the educational origins of upper management employees, 
that is, those who reached the rank of department head in the Japanese company 
and those who reached the vice presidential rank in the American company 
(Table 12). 
Table 12 shows that many employees in the vice presidential ranks of 
the American company are the alumni of schools that traditionally produce a 
disproportionate number of business executives: Yale, Harvard, Princeton and 
Columbia. The comparison between Tables 4 and 12 is illuminating. First, 
although the first four schools are the same in the two tables, five new 
schools, most of them highly competitive, suddenly appear in the table for 
upper management employees. Second, the proportion of workers who came from 
one of the eleven institutions, 22 percent in Table 4, rises to 34 percent in 
Table 12. In other words, the educational origin of upper management is much 
more concentrated than that of all employees. Although the American firm 
recruits extensively from a variety of institutions, our finding suggests that 
the alumni of a small number of competitive institutions are more likely to 
rise to senior positions. 
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In contrast, in the Japanese company, the schools in Table 4 and 12 
overlap substantially; there are only two new schools in Table 12, and the 
percentages for each college are very similar in the two tables. The only 
noticeable difference probably comes from the increasing share of Private 
School A in the upper management table, which is consistent with the 
regression analysis. Furthermore, the eleven largest schools in the 
distribution account for 63 percent of all employees in Table 4 and 67 percent 
in Table 12. Therefore, the concentration rates of educational origin are 
equally high at the recruitment stage and at the upper management level in the 
Japanese company. The distribution of college origins of upper management is 
likely to reflect the practice of a highly selective recruitment. 
Third, the results of our analysis of both the Japanese and American 
data may be taken as lending support to the hypothesis of higher cognitive and 
non-cognitive skills among the alumni of high-quality institutions, either 
because of the training provided in these institutions or because of superior 
ability of students who attend high-quality schools. Although the effects of 
college quality were not uniform across all organizational levels, this may 
stem from the fact that the skills which are possessed by employees who 
graduated from high-quality institutions are relevant to job performance at a 
particular level in the organizational hierarchy. 
Promotions in the lower levels of the organization are often automatic 
and scheduled. In the American company, the first transition (that is, entry 
into SGL 7) corresponds to the entry into administrative lines. Since our 
sample included only college graduates, most of them quickly transferred to an 
administrative line if they began in clerical job categories. Thus, automatic 
progression is the norm, and differences in the waiting time to reach SGL 7 
are not large. However, the second transition (that is, entry into SGL 14) is 
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more selective; as shown in our analysis, 73 percent of the employees were 
censored, that is, did not reach SGL 14. Moreover, job performance in the 
middle levels of the organization is likely to be influenced by job skills 
which are imparted by academic training in college (see also, Spilerman and 
Lunde 1991). 
Similarly, in the Japanese company, virtually every employee was 
eventually promoted to the rank of deputy section chief and about 90 percent 
of them reached the rank of section chief. The serious competition and 
sorting of employees takes place at the level of entry into upper management 
(Spilerman and Ishida 1995). It is in the transition from section chief to 
department head that the cognitive and non-cognitive skills of employees make 
perhaps the greatest difference, and employees who attended high-quality 
institutions are most likely to possess such skills. 
Finally, we close our discussion by evaluating the thesis of 
"educational credentialism." This thesis predicts that the effects of 
credentials, college quality and major, are more pervasive and persistent over 
an employee's entire working career in Japan than in the United States. The 
empirical evidence from our analysis provides, at best, weak support for this 
prediction. The influence of field of study appears to be more pervasive in 
the Japanese company than in the American company. However, the impact of 
college quality on promotion chances is not significant across all ranks of 
the Japanese organization, and its effect is not evidently more pervasive in 
the Japanese company. Therefore, we are inclined to conclude that although 
credentials do influence promotion chances, the thesis of "educational 




1. Takeuchi (1981, p.112) also reported that the differences among 
schools in the production rate were much smaller for managers in engineering 
than those in non-engineering. He suspected that those in the field of 
engineering were more likely to be subject to competition on the basis of 
ability and job performance and that this was probably due to the fact that 
performance was easier to measure in these fields. 
2. The distinction between deputy department head and department head was 
ignored following the suggestions of personnel managers of the Japanese 
company. Some employees were promoted from section chief to deputy department 
head in headquarters or large offices while others moved directly from section 
chief to department head or director of small branches. Although the 
destination titles may be different, these promotions were considered 
equivalent by the company. 
3. Standardized rank scores were given in Keisetsu Jidai, a journal for 
university applicants, published monthly by Obunsha. The scores were taken 
from the 1966, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1986 and 1993 issues because there were small 
fluctuations in the scores of individual schools. Depending upon the entry 
year, scores from the respective issues were used. We are grateful to Mr. 
Aral of the Center for University Entrance Exams, Obunsha Publishing, for 
giving us access to old issues of Keisetsu Jidai and for providing technical 
advice about the scores. 
4. Also used was Barron's Profile of American Colleges (1972) which 
provided freshmen SAT scores that were highly correlated with the scores given 
by Astin. Although Barron's contained SAT scores for fewer schools than 
Astin's list, it did include information for nine schools that were missing 
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from the latter source. In addition, in the cases in which employees had 
received graduate training, the school code used was that of the undergraduate 
rather than the graduate institution except in the cases of missing 
undergraduate school codes. 
5. A dummy variable (No College Information) was coded 0 if employees had 
valid college code and 1 otherwise. These employees were coded zero on the 
selectivity variable. 
6. A category of "no major" was combined with "other" major in the 
analysis of the American data since approximately 40 percent of the 
respondents across all SGLs did not have a valid code for the field of study. 
7. The American company grouped an L.L.B. degree into the category of 
"graduate study, with no advanced degree received." Therefore, we cannot 
separate employees with a L.L.B. degree. 
8. It was not possible to determine whether or not the employee completed 
the graduate training. 
9. Origin rank refers to the rank in which the promotion originated. For 
example, in the analysis of promotion from the rank of deputy section chief to 
that of section chief, origin rank is deputy section chief. It is not the 
rank in which the employee entered the firm. 
10. We also found the higher likelihood of promotion to grade level 7 
among the graduates of CUNY, City College. As noted, we could not offer any 
substantive interpretation for this effect. 
11. Censored cases include employees who have not reached SGL 14 as well 
as those who left the company. 
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